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Abstract 
The thesis consists of an introduction and four articles that can be read 
independently of each other.  
Article 1: "Biodiversity on Swedish pastures: Estimating biodiversity production 
costs", estimates the costs of producing biological diversity on Swedish permanent 
grasslands. A simple model is introduced where biodiversity on pastures is produced 
using grazing animals. In the article, biological diversity is considered a quantitative 
measure where a given quantity can be produced either by a small area with high 
quality or a larger area with lower quality. Box-Cox transformations are used in the 
empirical analysis and the results indicate that the biodiversity production costs 
differ between the two investigated regions.  
Article 2: "Transaction Costs and Agri-Environmental Policy Measures: are 
Preferences Influencing Policy Implementation?", investigates the transaction cost 
determinants of a Swedish agri-environmental policy measure. The problem is 
whether unavoidable 'economic factors' drive the transaction costs, or if potentially 
avoidable 'political factors' have an undue impact. Although initial results indicate 
that the share of voters voting for particular political configurations influences the 
level of transaction costs, the extreme bounds analysis shows that only the economic 
variables are robust with respect to model specifications. 
Article 3: "Multifunctionality – what does the literature tell us?", surveys the 
literature on multifunctional agriculture. It is shown i.a. that the level of transaction 
costs has to be considered when developing policies, that even optimal policies may 
be controversial from a trade perspective and that the spatial variation both in 
production and values should be accounted for.  
Article 4: "Are the Mediterranean countries competitive in fresh fruit and 
vegetable exports?", investigates the competitiveness of ten Mediterranean countries' 
fruit and vegetable sectors, utilizing various indicators and the results of a constant 
market share analysis. The results show that the competitiveness generally has 
declined in the 1990s and that the countries do not fully utilize their potentials. 
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1  Introduction 
 
This thesis includes four articles that share the common foundation that they 
all concern the supply of agricultural products and services.
1 Three of the 
articles focus on the multifunctionality of agriculture and one of the articles 
concerns trade in agricultural products. The articles cover a rather wide 
spectrum of topics and utilize completely different methods. The thesis is 
thus more of a compilation of independent articles than a collection of 
articles with a common theme.  
Going back to the most fundamental concepts in economics, supply and 
demand, one could say that this thesis is related to the supply side of 
agricultural goods, private as well as public. If there was no demand for these 
goods, the supply side would not be particularly interesting. Likewise, if 
there was no supply of the goods, little would it matter if there was a 
demand. Both sides are equally important, but the demand side is 
completely left to other researches, many of whom do not seem not to mind 
taking on the challenge of valuation of agricultural public goods.
2 In this 
thesis it is simply assumed that there is, or at least might be, a demand for 
certain agricultural public goods.
3  
                                                  
1 Since there is no principal difference between the concepts 'goods' and 'services', both goods 
and services are ordinary outputs of the production process, the concepts will be used 
interchangeably throughout this thesis.   
2 See for example the following publications for discussions of values and valuation methods: 
Bishop, 1982; Brown and Mendelsohn, 1984; Diamond and Hausman, 1994; Fisher and 
Hanemann, 1983; Garrod and Willis, 1999; Hanemann, 1994; Hanley and Spash, 1993; 
Randall, 1991, 1994, 1998, 2002; Vatn and Bromley, 1994; Weisbrod, 1964. 
3 Indeed, much research has been devoted to the valuation of agricultural public goods in 
recent years and there does seem to a willingness to pay for some of these goods (e.g. 
Hasund, 1998; Drake, 1992; Hampicke, 1990; Pruckner, 1995).    10 
The articles investigate different aspects of agricultural supply. To be 
more specific, three of the four articles are directly related to the concept of 
multifunctionality and the supply of landscape public goods. Article I 
investigates the costs of producing biological diversity on Swedish 
permanent pastures. Article II is also related to Swedish permanent pastures 
as it investigates the transaction cost determinants of a policy measure that 
aims to maintain the qualities of the pastures. Article III is a literature 
review, covering much of the multifunctionality literature that has been 
produced so far. Article IV diverges somewhat from the other articles and 
considers export supply of agricultural private goods. It investigates the 
competitiveness of ten Mediterranean countries' fruit and vegetable sectors. 
The thesis consists of four chapters. Following this introduction, the 
theoretical framework creating the foundations for the articles will be 
presented in three subchapters. The first subchapter presents the 
complications of externalities and public goods, which are at the core of the 
multifunctionality problem, and thus serves as an introduction to primarily 
Article I through Article III. The second subchapter discusses another 
divergence from the perfect competition set up, namely the existence of 
transaction costs, which is an important part of Article II. In the third 
subchapter, some fundamental trade theories and the most important aspects 
of the Armington model are presented. Subchapter three thus introduces 
Article IV since the Armington model creates the theoretical foundation for 
the method used in that paper. In chapter three the articles that make up this 
thesis are summarized. The thesis ends with a concluding discussion and 
some suggestions for future research.  
   11 
2  Theoretical framework 
The purpose of this chapter is mainly to put the articles of the thesis in 
context and clarify some aspects that were not possible to include in the 
articles due to space constraints. It thus serves more as an introduction to the 
articles than functions as a presentation of the theories and methodologies 
utilized in the articles.   
2.1  Externalities and public goods 
In the introduction of this thesis, it was mentioned that the existence of 
public goods and externalities was at the core of the multifunctionality 
problem. Even though one sometimes might get the impression that the 
study of externalities and public goods is a rather recent phenomenon, it 
could in fact be traced back to the very origins of economic science. Even 
Adam Smith, the father of classical economics and usually considered a 
champion of laissez-faire both for reasons of economic efficiency and as a 
moral imperative, acknowledged the need for government interventions. In 
his Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Smith claimed 
that under certain circumstances the market could not secure the optimal 
supply of goods or services. He divided the tasks of the government in three 
groups that all could be claimed to have public good characteristics: i.) The 
defense of the country; ii.) The protection of civil liberties and the 
administration of justice; and iii.) The construction of certain other public 
works and institutions. Regarding the third task, Smith wrote that the 
sovereign had the duty of: 
 
"…erecting and maintaining certain public works and certain public 
institutions which it can never be for the interest of any individual, or small 
number of individuals, to erect and maintain; because the profit could never   12 
repay the expense to any individual or small number of individuals, though it 
may frequently do much more than repay it to a great society."  
Adam Smith (1776, pp. 687-688)  
 
Thus, interest in public goods has been present ever since the beginning of 
classical economics.  
There is however some truth to the statement that the concept of public 
goods traditionally has been fairly ignored by economists to the advantage of 
a perfect competition setting. It was not until the 1950's after the publication 
of the seminal articles by Samuelson (1954, 1955), which provided a formal 
foundation of prior ideas, that research interest really started to grow. At 
first, the focus was on the two extremes, pure private and pure public goods, 
where the former could be efficiently handled by markets and the latter had 
to be supplied collectively.  
The reason why pure public goods often are supplied collectively, if at 
all, is because they are characterized by perfect non-excludability and perfect 
non-rivalry. Perfect non-excludability implies that it is impossible to exclude 
anyone from benefiting from the good in question; perfect non-rivalry 
implies that additional consumption of the good in question does not dilute 
the benefit that already existing consumers might gain from their 
consumption. The deterrent effect of a defense system or the results of 
pollution controls are typical pure public goods. At the other extreme are 
private goods, goods such as food, drinks, fuel and clothes, where the 
benefits are perfectly rival and perfectly excludable. That a good is perfectly 
rival implies that any consumption of it completely and proportionally 
destroys the possibility of anyone else to consume it. Perfect excludability 
implies that the owner of the good costlessly can control the benefits. These 
classifications make it clear that pure private and pure public goods indeed 
are the extremes in a spectrum of characteristics.     
About ten years after Samuelson's articles, Olson's (1965) "Logic of 
collective action" and Buchanan's (1965) "An economic theory of clubs" 
sparked extended research into impure public goods, i.e. goods that belong 
neither to the class of perfectly private goods nor the class of perfectly public 
goods. The category of impure public goods thus covers goods within a 
wide spectrum of characteristics. In this spectrum, a club good is a special 
example of a thoroughly studied type of good with particular characteristics. 
A club good is a good from which consumers can be excluded and that may 
or may no be congestible, i.e. possessing rivalry. Commonly mentioned 
examples of such goods are swimming pools and golf clubs, but schools, 
highways and national parks have also been suggested as examples of club   13 
goods. A club good could be allocated efficiently by a group of individuals if 
the efficiency gains that are created are higher than the exclusion- and 
allocation costs. In addition, a sufficient share of those benefits has to fall 
upon the group members. The existence of club goods thus reduces the 
need for government intervention since these goods can be supplied by 
groups of individuals or by profit maximizing enterprises. 
Another special type of impure public goods commonly mentioned in 
the literature is open access resources. The open access resources differ from 
the pure public goods through a higher degree of rivalry; if a person 
increases (decreases) his consumption of the open access resource, it will 
affect the utility of other users negatively (positively). That is, even though 
the individual consumer increases his own utility when consuming the 
good, that consumption has an external cost damaging other consumers. 
The open access resources are also called common property resources and 
could lead to the 'tragedy of commons', as described by Hardin (1968). The 
tragedy of commons implies that if there is a resource of economic value 
from which it is not possible to exclude consumers, and which is rival as 
described above, no individual user has an incentive to use the resource 
sparsely. This incentive problem is indeed as relevant today as ever with 
ongoing problems such as over-fishing, over-grazing and deforestation.  
Both the club goods and the open access resources are examples of goods 
in the range of impure public goods. As mentioned though, they are just 
two particular examples: any good that is not at either of the two extremes 
and thus does not display the properties perfect excludability/rivalry or 
perfect non-excludability/non-rivalry, are impure public goods. Some 
specific examples have been presented above as being typically private or 
public goods. It is very important to remember though that it is not the 
actual physical goods or services that per se possess the specific degrees of 
rivalry or excludability. This becomes clear when considering the existence 
of technological advances that challenge current properties. Television and 
radio broadcasts, for example, used to be considered perfectly public within 
the range of the transmissions. Now, with access to electronic scrambling, 
the suppliers can choose whether to supply the transmission as a private or a 
public good.  
In the literature, the concept of externalities is usually treated parallel to 
the concept of public goods. This approach is common not because the two 
phenomena necessarily appear together, but because they often do, especially 
when environmental problems are discussed. Like public goods, externalities 
may warrant government intervention. That is especially the case when 
externalities simultaneously are public goods. The externality rationale for   14 
government intervention was first introduced by Pigou (1920) and refers to 
the situation when the action of one economic agent influences the utility or 
production of another, without any mechanism for compensation.
4 Usually, 
externalities are seen as unintended by-products of the products that actually 




"An external economy (diseconomy) is an event which confers an 
appreciable benefit (inflicts an appreciable damage) on some person or 
persons who were not fully consenting parties in reaching the decision or 
decisions which led directly or indirectly to the event in question."  
Meade (1973, p. 15) 
 
Thus, externalities may be positive or negative, i.e.  creating benefits or 
inflicting harm.
6 The problem occurs by the fact that without an appropriate 
institutional framework, those that create the externalities may have no 
incentives to react to the existence of the externalities. That is, they will 
only take their own costs and benefits into account when making decisions, 
not the costs and benefits of those affected. By pure chance, it might be the 
case that the positive effects exactly outweigh the negative effects. Normally 
though, the private good could be expected to be either over-supplied 
(negative externalities) or under-supplied (positive externalities). This 
implies that there is a divergence between what would be optimal from the 
society’s point of view and what the market generates: the socially optimal 
production of private goods and externalities is not equal to the 
spontaneously reached market outcome. One effective way to approach this 
divergence is through the concepts of private costs and social costs/benefits. 
The producers aim to maximize profits considering all relevant private costs 
while simultaneously ignoring the social costs and benefits resulting from the 
production. The resulting production level is usually inefficient from the 
                                                  
4  In the following, I will completely ignore the so-called pecuniary externalities.  
5 This is indeed a rather wide definition. An alternative formulation is presented by Arrow 
(1970), and discussions on definitions are provided by e.g.  Baumol and Oates (1988), 
Buchanan and Stubblebine (1962) and Heller and Starret (1976). 
6 It should be noted though, that the decision of what is to be considered a positive or 
negative externality respectively is a normative issue and dependent on people’s preferences. 
It is impossible to define on purely physical grounds when an externality is positive or 
negative (e.g. Vatn and Bromley, 1997). The question of what it is that should be protected 
in a certain situation can only be decided through the defining of rights to resources 
(Coase, 1960) and the distribution of rights is obviously a normative issue (Bromley, 1991).   15 
society's point of view since optimality is reached only if all costs and 
benefits are incorporated in the production decision.  
The difference between the socially optimal production level and the 
production level that occurs when only private costs are taken into account 
could be exemplified by a farmer that produces meat using grazing animals. 
The farmer has private costs of production, he has to pay for the land, care 
for the animals and so forth. The true costs of production, the total costs, are 
however lower than the private costs. The animals contribute positively to 
the biological diversity of the area and the total costs are the costs that 
remain after the social benefits have been deducted from the private costs. 
When the farmer aims to maximize his profit, he considers the private costs 
only and market equilibrium is reached where the demand curve crosses the 
private cost curve. The socially optimal production on the other hand 
would occur where the demand schedule crosses the total cost curve. The 
fundamental economic, and therefore environmental, problem with positive 
externalities is that the farmers do not become fully reimbursed for their 
production. In the case of negative externalities, the mirroring problem is 
that farmers do not have to carry the full costs of the damage they inflict on 
others 
In this setting, the government could be viewed as an independent agent 
who could correct the production mix through an appropriate set of 
Pigouvian taxes and subsidies. If sufficient information is available to the 
policy maker, i.e. information on the marginal damages or benefits inflicted 
on the receiving parties, then a tax-subsidy system could be set up that made 
the social and private cost curves coincide.  
    However, in order to develop efficient policies when multiple 
externalities are present, it is important to take all externalities into account 
(OECD, 2001). This leads to the question if it ever could be conceivable to 
create an economy wide system of externality correcting taxes and subsidies. 
Since ultimately most private activities that change the status quo create 
external effects at some level, a full scale externality correcting system would 
take on information requirements of Herculean proportions. Thus, the 
Mises-Hayek (e.g. Hayek, 1945) argument against full scale planning also has 
validity in the more restricted setting of externalities. Notice though, that 
the Mises-Hayek argument in this setting is not an argument against 
Pigouvian taxes per se, but it is an argument that one should consider twice 
before attempting to apply the system on activities where the benefits are 
likely to be marginal.  
The problem with information requirements leads to another line of 
inquiry into the externality problem, created by Coase (1960) with the   16 
publication of "The problem of social cost". After the publication, it became 
clear to economists that the pure existence of externalities does not 
necessarily warrant government intervention. An alternative solution is to 
assign entitlements and let those that create the externalities and those 
affected by them bargain over the allocation. In the absence of transaction 
costs, such a procedure would lead to an efficient allocation and remove the 
need for further government intervention. This has come to be known as 
the Coase theorem. In essence, what the assignment of rights does is to 
expand the private markets to intangible commodities that previously were 
not subject to transactions.  
According to OECD (2001), it may sometimes be useful to differentiate 
between externalities depending on if they are produced with or without 
opportunity costs. The opportunity costs are in this case related to the extra 
costs the producers face when producing the externalities. They may for 
example stem from extra costs for the inputs needed for the production of 
the externalities. This kind of production of externalities with opportunity is 
essentially equivalent to joint production of two or more goods constrained 
by allocable fixed factors. A farmer may for example divert from common 
techniques and utilize more labour in order to increase the supply of positive 
externalities, intentionally controlling the amount of externalities provided.  
It is arguably so that it may be useful to include the intended externalities 
when discussing multifunctionality because it might simplify discussions: if 
farmers respond to e.g. new support systems and increase the amount of 
landscape amenities they produce using extra resources, it could be referred 
to as an increased supply of externalities. If, on the other hand, externalities 
are defined as unintended side effects of activities (e.g. Dorfman, 1993), 
intended outputs could of course not be classified as externalities. 
Externalities without opportunity costs, i.e. unintended externalities, are the 
form of externalities that is more commonly discussed; they are generated 
automatically without consuming any extra resources. Although there is a 
point to it that the inclusion of intended outputs in the concept of 
externalities sometimes could facilitate discussion, on a grander scale it 
probably complicates it. There is simply no need to blur the distinction 
between externalities and joint production. Referring to Mishan (1971), 
Baumol and Oates (1988) and how the concept traditionally has been treated 
in economics, an externality is the unintended product produced jointly with 
another product; if the product is intentionally produced, then it is not an 
externality.
7 Although it may be impossible for an external spectator, or even 
                                                  
7 It should be pointed out that not all economists agree with this statement (e.g. Vatn and 
Bromley, 1997).    17 
for the producer, to spot clearly the point when marginal production is 
produced jointly rather as an externality, it is still important to keep the 
concepts separated.  
As mentioned previously, the concepts of externalities and public goods 
are at the core of the multifunctionality problems. At the most fundamental 
level, if there are neither externalities nor public goods associated with a 
certain type of production, it can not be argued from a welfare perspective 
that policy measures are necessary. In conclusion, a necessary criterion for 
the implementation of policies for multifunctional agriculture is that 
production is characterized by externalities and that the resulting products 
are public goods.  
2.2  Transaction costs 
 
Although all too often neglected in economic analyses, most, if not all, 
economic transactions include some form of transaction costs. Broadly 
defined, they include all costs that are not specifically a part of the physical 
production process. Coase (1937) argues that firms are created as means to 
lower transaction costs. The basic reason is that even at the most 
fundamental level, there are costs attributable to the utilization of the price 
mechanism; it is costly to discover the relevant relative prices. In a similar 
vein of argument, one could claim that the creation of institutions aims to 
lower transaction costs (e.g. Williamson, 1985; Bromley, 1989; Hodgson, 
1988). Following Coase and Williamson, a large literature has since 
demonstrated that transaction costs to some extent can explain industry 
structure and decision making (Globerman and Schwindt, 1986; Pittman, 
1991; Leffler and Rucker, 1991; Lyons, 1994). Most of the transaction cost 
literature has so far focused on transactions in the market.    
   When externalities were discussed previously, it was simply assumed that 
they exist and create suboptimal allocations, but it was not discussed why 
they exist. It could be claimed that the problem leading to market 
equilibriums that diverge from the Pareto optimum is the presence of 
transaction costs (e.g. Calabresi, 1968). If transaction costs were sufficiently 
low, it would always be possible for those that produce the externalities and 
those affected to negotiate and internalize the externalities. The externalities 
would cease to exist and a Pareto optimal resource allocation would be 
formed. This is basically the essence of the Coase theorem (Coase, 1960). 
Consequently one could claim that defining some goods as externalities is 
not necessary: there is no special kind of market failure associated with   18 
externalities, they are simply normal goods with the exception that the costs 
of organizing market exchange are too high.  
Clearly, transaction costs do exist and they may make up a substantial 
fraction of the total transaction value (e.g. Falconer and Whitby, 1999a, 
1999b, 2000; Rorstad et al., 2007). The sources of transaction costs vary but 
they could in general terms be described as costs that are linked to activities 
that are associated with exchange. According to Dahlman (1979), the 
fundaments of transaction costs are linked to the temporal stages of 
transactions and include: i.) Search and information costs; ii.) Bargaining and 
decision costs; and iii.) Policing and enforcement costs. Market transactions 
can be expected to take place when the resources that must be spent on 
those activities are lower than the expected gains from the actual 
transactions. Even if it may be useful to differentiate between these classes 
for analytical purposes, Dahlman also shows that the three classes of costs 
boil down to one single source; in all stages, resources are lost because of 
imperfect information. In addition to Dahlman, a rather large literature deals 
with factors that influence the level of transaction costs (Coase, 1960; 
Williamson, 1985; North, 1990; Griffin, 1991; Easter, 1993; Stavins, 1995; 
Challen, 2000; Vatn, 1998).  
According to Williamson (1985), there are three principal dimensions 
through which transactions ought to be analyzed and described. The 
dimensions are frequency, uncertainty and asset specificity. High asset specificity 
implies that the good involved has few alternative uses or buyers. Recurrent 
transactions with low uncertainty and low asset specificity generally have 
lower costs than transactions where the dimensions are reversed. These 
dimensions are highly relevant when analyzing agri-environmental policies 
for multifunctional production. Many of the goods that are of interest for 
the society to promote are characterized by high asset specificity and low 
frequency in transactions. In some cases there is also a high degree of 
uncertainty. A study of the Swedish agri-environmental program that is 
clearly influenced by Williamson's thoughts is Eklund (1999). According to 
the study, five principal factors influence the level of transaction costs: i.) 
The character of the good; ii.) The design of the measures; iii.) 
Administrative institutions; iv.) The type and degree of uncertainty; and v.) 
The frequency of transactions. The factors that seem to have the most 
substantial impacts on the level of transaction costs in the case of the 
Swedish agri-environmental program are the complexity of the kind of 
goods the government intends to promote and the complexity of the design 
of the policy measures, but the other factors may also be important 
depending on circumstances. There may for example be high start up costs   19 
that fall over time once the policy is in place, the decline being due to the 
recurrence of transactions and diminishing information needs. This latter 
point has been supported by Falconer and Whitby (1999a, 2000) in their 
study of the transaction costs incurred in the public sector due to the 
introduction and existence of agri-environmental policies. They conclude 
that not only are transaction costs often ignored when policies are developed 
or evaluated, they also tend to be of significant value. An important point is 
that substantial transaction costs do not necessarily mean that there has to be 
a waste of resources, the efficiency might still be high. However, the 
substantial amount of resources spent on transactions point to the need for 
thorough investigations of the administrative efficiency. The authors stress 
that transaction costs and their implications should be considered to be of 
major importance in public policy decision making.  
The importance of striking the right balance between transaction costs 
and precision is stressed by Romstad et al. (2000). Just because transaction 
costs absolutely, or as share of expenditures, are higher for some policies 
than other does it not mean that the more expensive ones are less efficient. 
General payments directly related to acreage would clearly have low 
transaction costs in absolute numbers as well as share of total payments. Such 
policies are however, due to the weak precision, unlikely to be suitable for 
the goods that are of interest to promote. Using more specific instruments 
and policies are likely to involve higher transaction costs, but the better 
precision might lower total costs and create environmental gains that far 
outweigh the transaction costs.  
The number of theoretical and empirical papers examining the size and 
impact of transaction costs for agri-environmental policy measures have 
increased substantially, although from a very low level, in the last couple of 
years. For example, Vatn et al. (2002) and Vatn (2001, 2002) try to clarify 
what it means that an agricultural production system is multifunctional but 
the focus is on the implications of transaction costs for agricultural policies. 
Although the complexities of transaction costs are thoroughly discussed, 
transaction costs as a specified function of some factors is not included in the 
model. The authors settle with the statement that the transaction costs will 
increase the higher the precision of the policies. The main conclusions is 
that it may be optimal to pay for the public good via an associated private 
good, depending on the type of production relationships, if transaction costs 
are positive. A trade-off has to be made between transaction costs and 
precision if the production relationships are not perfectly joint.   
Rorstad et al. (2007), investigate the differences between the transaction 
costs of various Norwegian agricultural and agri-environmental policy   20 
measures through interviews with stakeholders. The policies cover the entire 
range from low asset specificity and high frequency to high asset specificity 
and low frequency. Clearly, the level of transaction costs varies significantly 
depending on the point of application, asset specificity and transaction 
frequency, where very specific, low frequency measures carry relatively high 
costs. In a study that explores the transaction costs of agri-environmental 
policy schemes based on management agreements, Falconer et al. (2001) 
show that there are efficiencies of scale with respect to the number of 
agreements formed within an area as well as to scheme experience. The data 
also show that the administration costs as share of total costs decline over 
time, although still remaining substantial. Falconer and Saunders (2002) 
investigate the public and private transaction costs of management 
agreements on ‘sites of special scientific interests’, including those under the 
English Wildlife Enhancement Scheme. The study was confined to the 
direct costs related to concluding and operating the management 
agreements. The absolute level of negotiation costs was significant, as were 
the costs as share of compensation payments, especially for the wildlife 
enhancement schemes. 
One of the most extensive studies of transaction costs and agri-
environmental policy measures in the European context is Falconer and 
Whitby (1999b) where the transaction costs of 37 schemes in 8 countries are 
estimated. The focus of the study was on the public sector and the direct 
organizational costs of the schemes. The scale and objectives of the measures 
are very diverse and it is therefore not surprising that the magnitude of 
transaction costs varies substantially. However, in general transaction costs 
seem to decline with time and fixed initial costs may be very important and 
make up a large share of total transaction costs. 
Although the number of articles investigating the transaction costs of 
agri-environmental policy measures has increased in recent years, there is 
still a lack of empirical knowledge about the determinants that cause the 
transaction costs. Article II in this thesis attempts to remedy some of that 
lack.  
2.3  Some trade aspects 
Early trade theory had a problem dealing with bilateral trade due to the 
assumption of homogeneity among commodities. Prior to Armington 
(1969), nearly all focus of trade theory was on comparative advantages that 
foresaw complete specialization except for under very special circumstances. 
David Ricardo was the first to clarify that all countries gain from trade   21 
because what determines the efficient allocation is comparative advantages, 
not absolute advantages. Focusing on labor productivity, the theory foresaw 
that countries would export products where the utilized labor was relatively 
efficient compared to labor in other countries. Subsequently, Heckscher 
(1919) and Ohlin (1924) improved the theory by developing a model with 
both industry and agriculture that included the productive factors land and 
capital in addition to labor. The Heckscher-Ohlin model focused on how 
the variation in availability of the factors impacted specialization and trade 
patterns. Subsequent mathematical improvements by Samuelson led to the 
notion of the Hecksher-Ohlin-Samuelson trade theory that foresees that a 
country will specialize in the production of commodities that use the factors 
with which the country is relatively well endowed intensively. This implies 
that rich, developed countries like Germany or the USA should export 
capital intensive products and poor countries like Morocco should export 
labor intensive products. Even though being much refined over Ricardo's 
approach, it still does not account for variations in demand since the model 
assumes that consumer preferences are identical and homothetic and that 
products are homogenous.  
Clearly, countries do not specialize completely and products are not 
homogenous. Likewise, particular countries both import and export certain 
commodities, i.e. there is intra industry trade (iit).
8 One of the first extensive 
empirical attempts to estimate the extent of iit was performed by Grubel 
and Lloyd (1975). Their empirical results sparked much interest and led to 
substantial theoretical improvement by Lancaster (1975) and Dixit and 
Stiglitz (1977).
9 Some years later, Helpman and Krugman (1985) showed 
that the Heckscher-Ohlin trade theory and the 'New Trade Theory' were 
complementary in nature. Focusing on the demand side and trade in 
agricultural products, Armington (1969) acknowledged that consumers 
might not find the origin of commodities irrelevant. Removing the 
assumption of homogenous products, he treated commodities of different 
origins as different commodities; i.e., an Israeli orange is not identical to a 
Moroccan orange, they are two different commodities. To facilitate 
estimation, Armington suggested that demand could be modeled in two 
stages. In the first stage, the consumer chooses between 'aggregate' goods 
given his income, i.e. the consumer simply considers oranges to be oranges 
no matter the origin. Then, in a second stage, the consumer can direct his 
                                                  
8 For a recent overview of the IIT literature and trade in agri-food products, see Sarker and 
Surry (2006). 
9 And subsequently Lancaster (1979, 1980), Krugman (1979, 1980) and Helpman (1981), 
among others.   22 
consumption to oranges of different countries, thus capturing the aspect that 
consumers might have preferences both for domestic and various foreign 
oranges. The Armington model has since its introduction been frequently 
used by agricultural economists to model intra industry trade in agricultural 
products (e.g. Thursby et al., 1986; Babula, 1987; Johnson et al., 1979; 
Alston et al., 1990).   
The major share of Article IV is devoted to a Constant Market Share 
analysis (cms) of Mediterranean fruit and vegetable exports. Despite the 
frequent utilization of the method in analyses of trade patterns (e.g. Rigaux, 
1971; Bowen and Pelzman, 1984; Brownie and Dalziel, 1993; Hayward and 
Erickson, 1995; Juswanto and Mulyanti, 2003; ECB, 2005), the cms 
methodology has been criticized on the grounds that it should lack a 
theoretical foundation (e.g. Houston, 1967; Richardson, 1971a,b). Although 
that used to be true, there is now a solid theoretical foundation. Merkies and 
van der Meer (1988) have successfully linked the cms that is due to Leamer 
and Stern (1970) to a two stages Armington model. Furthermore, following 
the suggestion by Ahmadi-Esfahani (2006) and complementing the cms 
results with those generated by other methods, conclusions from the analysis 
can be strengthened further.   
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3  Summary of articles 
3.1  Article I: Biodiversity on Swedish pastures: Estimating 
biodiversity production costs. 
The agricultural landscape provides both private goods, for example food 
and fibers, and public goods such as biodiversity. There is however a 
substantial variation in the impact agriculture has on the biodiversity. The 
variation depends to a large extent on historic management and the type of 
agricultural practices employed. Whereas agriculture's ability to produce 
private goods clearly is important from the society’s point of view, the 
quantity and quality of biodiversity produced is also important for the 
society. A multitude of factors influence the level of biodiversity in the 
agricultural landscape, and one can conclude that the common 
misunderstanding that human activities necessarily have a negative effect on 
biodiversity simply is flawed. Some of the most interesting areas in the 
landscape, from a biodiversity point of view, are those that have a long 
history of human interactions with the natural environment. Most notably, 
meadows, pastures and their relics are important habitats for many red-listed 
species (Swedish Environmental Protection Agency, 1997).  
In this article, the production costs of biological diversity on Swedish 
semi-natural and cultivated pastures are estimated. If policy makers aim to 
develop efficient policy measures, it is important to know both the costs of 
production and the values of the public goods resulting from the 
production. This paper improves the knowledge of biodiversity production 
costs in the pastoral landscape insofar as it provides a link between the costs 
of managing pastures and the biological diversity that is the result of that 
management. The costs of producing biodiversity are the additional costs   24 
that result from keeping livestock on pastures rather than utilizing the 
alternative, most profitable, methods to produce milk or meat.  
The specific costs for each pasture have been calculated and rely on the 
essential assumption that a specific level of grazing pressure is upheld on all 
well maintained pastures. Since the costs are simulated, this paper uses a 
semi-economic engineering approach. In a pure economic engineering 
approach, the entire production process leading to the final product is 
described and calculated (French, 1977). In this study, one crucial step in the 
production process is lacking, namely a model of nature’s process where the 
inputs land and grazing pressure are transformed into the final product 
biodiversity. Consequently, it is not a pure economic engineering study 
since the cost calculations are combined with collected data for the final 
product.  
Biodiversity is a quantitative measure of the biological diversity that 
incorporates two relevant factors into one measure. The area of the pasture 
is multiplied by a joint indicator for the absolute biodiversity quality of the 
pasture. The joint indicator is constructed by summing four sub-indicator 
values for type of land, vascular plant species, bush diversity and 
maintenance. The sub-indicators have different weights according to the 
influence they are considered to have on biodiversity in pastures. Box-Cox 
transformations are used to estimate the functional form of the cost function. 
To get the most general shape, the combined Box-Cox (Box and Cox, 
1964) and Box-Tidwell (Box and Tidwell, 1962) function is used, allowing 
all variables, dependent and independent, to be transformed by different 
lambdas. The data are characterized by heteroscedasticity which is handled 
by using variances as functions of the biodiversity quantity. 
The main result is that biodiversity production costs differ between 
geographical areas of Sweden. For low levels of production, the marginal 
costs are lower in the Selaö area than in the Vetlanda area. When production 
increases though, the situation is reversed and marginal costs are higher in 
the Selaö area than in the Vetlanda area. This is an important result since it 
implies that policy makers should consider the differences between different 
areas when developing policy measures. Spatially homogenous payments 
may result in a situation where producers in high cost areas are not paid 
sufficiently and valuable areas are lost. Alternatively, producers in low cost 
areas are paid a premium and make an economic rent. An excess burden is 
thus created through the collection of taxes. In either case, it implies an 
inefficient use of resources. This paper also makes two other contributions 
to the literature: it develops and tests a method of estimating costs for   25 
production of biodiversity on permanent pastures and it illustrates 
biodiversity supply functions. 
3.2  Article II: Transaction costs and agri-environmental policy 
measures: are preferences influencing policy 
implementation? 
The agri-environmental policy measures are of increasing importance. That 
is especially the case in the European Union with the ongoing transfer from 
commodity related support to decoupled area payments complemented by 
payments for non-commodity outputs. When agri-environmental policy 
measures increase in importance, transaction costs become increasingly 
important to study if efficient policy measures are strived for. This paper 
aims to increase the understanding of what determines the level of 
transaction costs by analyzing how economic and political factors influence 
it. In the paper, the transaction costs of the Swedish agri-environmental 
policy measure that aims to support the qualities of semi-natural pastures are 
investigated. This particular measure has been chosen because of its 
resemblance to measures in other European countries and the results are thus 
applicable to not only the Swedish context. More specifically, the paper 
investigates the determinants of the county authorities’ costs for setting up 
maintenance plans for the permanent pastures that participate in the system. 
Although to some extent fulfilling an educational function, the costs of 
creating the maintenance plans could essentially be classified as pure 
transaction costs.  
The costs per plan vary substantially between the 21 Swedish counties. 
Since no apparent reason for these cost variations can be easily found, the 
challenge is to investigate if the variations can be attributable to reasonably 
objective economic factors, such as pasture density or distances, or if other 
factors, such as preferences and political attitudes at the county level, 
influence the costs. The paper contributes to the literature by empirically 
investigating the determinants of transaction costs for the implementation of 
agri-environmental policy measures, or more precisely, compensation 
schemes for preservation of semi-natural pastures in Sweden. It also applies 
the extreme bounds analysis (eba) methodology to a new area, investigating 
the robustness of political and economic influences on the transaction costs 
of a European agri-environmental policy measure. The utilized eba method 
is due to Leamer (1978) and it is a suitable method to check if the 
independent variables are robustly related to the dependent variable or if 
they are fragile and depend on certain specifications to be significant.   26 
Another contribution is that is summarizes the existing literature that 
estimates transaction costs of agri-environmental policy measures. 
In the analysis, the transaction cost determinants are split into two groups. 
In the first group, all factors that reasonably should affect transaction costs are 
included. Examples of such factors are the size and number of pastures in a 
county, the quality of pastures and the number of years that has passed since 
the introduction of the measure. This group of variables is called 'economic 
variables'. The other group includes all variables that on pure economic 
grounds reasonably should not affect the level of transaction costs. This 
group of variables is called 'political variables' and includes factors such as 
membership in lobby groups, political preferences, income- and education 
levels.  
A preliminary analysis is performed by utilization of pooled data and 
ordinary least squares regressions. The results of that analysis show that five 
of the economic variables are significant. The variables have the expected 
signs and it appears that the size and number of pastures increases transaction 
costs, whereas a high general quality of pastures decreases transaction costs. 
There is also a significant learning effect as costs decrease with time. In 
addition to the economic variables, four political variables are significant. 
The results indicate that a high preference for the Christian democrats, the 
left wing block or the right wing block increases transaction costs, whereas a 
high preference for the Green party decreases transaction costs. Although the 
results are interesting, not particularly inconclusive and the regressions 
evidently capturing a large share of the variability, it is necessary to 
strengthen the results further. Since the paper is exploratory, it is desirable to 
establish if the parameters are robust with respect to model specifications. 
Therefore, in order to improve the strength of the results and establish if the 
political variables indeed are robust, an extreme bounds analysis is 
performed.  
The extreme bounds analysis does not verify the robustness of all the 
variables that came out as significant in the initial analysis. Indeed, all the 
political variables are fragile according to both the strong and weak eba 
criteria. Only the relatively fundamental economic variables, such as the 
number of plans created and the size of the pastures, pass either of the eba 
criteria. Thus, it appears as if level of the transaction costs investigated in this 
paper are not related to political factors but only to economic factors and 
that administrators at the county levels are not unduly affected by local 
politics and public preferences.    27 
3.3  Article III: Multifunctional agriculture – what does the 
literature tell us? 
Given the width of recent research that concerns the multifunctionality of 
agriculture and associated policies, the main purpose of Article III is to 
survey the multifunctionality literature that has been published up to date.    
At the core of the problem is the fact that multifunctionality, at one level 
or another, necessarily implies that there is some form of relation between 
different goods or values, relations that sometimes may be difficult to notice 
or clarify. One of the most obvious types of relations that could be present is 
a physical joint production between private and public goods, e.g. the joint 
production of biological diversity and extensive farming. However, the 
objects in an area, or the general appearance of an entire area, may affect the 
values of another area even if they have no physical relation or effect on 
each other. For example, if the quality of a certain field is degraded over 
time due to the absence of grazing animals, it could affect the values of 
nearby fields that still are identically the same as previously. Consequently, 
different areas or objects can be relational even if there is no actual physical 
joint production taking place.  
One necessary condition for efficient policy measures is that it is possible 
to estimate the values of the public goods in question. It follows from the 
difficulty of identifying the different production and value linkages between 
various objects that it also is problematic to estimate the values correctly. 
There are various methods available for value estimation purposes, but 
unfortunately, none of them is flawless. Furthermore, even if it is possible to 
estimate the values of one specific area correctly, one can not necessarily use 
those estimates on a different, physically identical area. One of the main 
reasons for this is that the use values that people attribute to an area depend 
on the geographical location. It should also be remembered that the values 
of one area might change when the quality of adjacent areas are modified. 
This implies that it is a difficult and costly process, if at all possible, to get 
the values absolutely correct everywhere. 
The policy makers should probably not strive for perfect estimates as that 
is likely to result in excessively high transaction costs for the policy 
measures. Optimal policy measures have to strike the right balance between 
transaction costs and effectiveness in order to achieve efficiency. One way of 
approaching efficiency with lower information requirements is to utilize 
indicators as information carriers. The presence, or absence, of indicators 
may be used to estimate the type and extent of the biological diversity or 
other values in an area. Efficient policy measures should then reimburse the 
farmers for their production of public goods up to the point where the   28 
marginal benefit equals the marginal costs, taking transaction costs into 
account. That is, if correct estimates are attained for the values of the public 
goods in an area and the farmer is paid in accordance with those values, then 
profit maximization will ensure that the efficient production level is reached. 
Other considerations may of course influence the farmer’s production 
decision but generally and in the long run, efficient allocations will be 
reached.         
If a single country was to succeed in developing efficient policy measures 
that enhance the welfare of that country, the policy measures could still be 
controversial as they may affect trade flows. Trade flows that are diverted 
away from their free trade equilibrium will lead to diminished welfare in at 
least one country. For that reason are in the current world trading system 
only those agricultural policies that are not at all or at most minimally trade 
distorting deemed completely acceptable. Since many efficient policies will 
not be perfectly decoupled from production, they are likely to be looked 
upon with suspicion from the trading partners. However, if it can be shown 
that the policy measures indeed are efficient, that the global benefits 
outweigh global costs and that the measures only affect trading patterns 
slightly, then it should be possible for trading partners to accept the policies. 
A main issue in order to gain acceptance for efficient measures would be to 
clearly demonstrate and prove the above mentioned properties to trading 
partners. 
One can conclude that substantial work remains to be done if efficient 
policy measures are to be developed for the provision of landscape public 
goods. On the demand side there is a potential for improved valuation 
methods that could be used to get more precise value estimates of the 
services the agricultural landscape produces. Additional valuation studies 
probably have to be performed using the best methods available in order to 
get a more complete picture of how the society values the different 
attributes of the landscape. As for the supply, further research is needed on 
the design of efficient policy measures. What form should the measures take 
in order to improve welfare at the lowest possible cost? Well functioning 
indicators that are able to present complex information cost efficiently in a 
comprehensive form need to be further developed. Politically, there is a 
need to clarify for the electorate the different costs and benefits that current 
and alternative payment systems imply. On the international level, nations 
have to agree on rules for trade in agricultural products that make it possible 
to use efficient policy measures even if they to some extent may divert trade 
from the free trade equilibrium. Even if much remains to be done, research 
in the area is progressing fast and the knowledge today is much more   29 
substantial compared to a decade ago. If the research continues to be 
developed at this pace, the goal of efficient policy measures for the 
production of landscape public goods may be reached within a reasonable 
amount of time. 
3.4  Article IV: Are the Mediterranean countries competitive in 
fresh fruit and vegetable exports?
10 
For the countries surrounding the Mediterranean Sea, trade has often been 
an important wealth-creating vehicle. The ongoing liberalization process in 
the world brings opportunities to the region and is especially important for 
the agricultural sector. Since large parts of the Mediterranean economies 
depend on agriculture, freer trade could be a stimulus to the region. 
Although trade in horticultural products has increased substantially over the 
last decades, trade could increase further if the protective measures of major 
trading partners were reduced (Huang, 2004).  
Article IV investigates the competitiveness of the non-processed fruit and 
vegetable sectors of ten Mediterranean countries. The analysis is based on 
two foundations. Firstly, the importance of the sectors for the economies 
and their exports is assessed through the presentation of a set of indicators 
such as Relative Unit Values (ruv) and Revealed Comparative Advantage 
(rca). Additional information, including sector shares in national exports 
and per capita exports, is presented in order to give a broader picture of the 
importance of the sectors to the economies. Secondly, the trade 
performance of the fruit and vegetable sectors in the countries is analyzed 
through a constant market share (cms) analysis. 
The  rca measure is one indication of a country’s specialization with 
respect to specific commodities and provides useful information about trade 
prospects. The ruv indicator measures the average unit value of a country’s 
exports in relation to the world average unit value. When commodities are 
heterogeneous, a high ruv indicates superior quality and thus can not be 
viewed as a sign of poor price competitiveness. The cms analysis is a 
traditional tool, first used to analyze international trade by Tyszynski (1951), 
that often has been used to deal with structural effects. The cms analysis has 
since been applied, in various versions, on many regions and periods. In this 
paper, the method chosen to decompose the development of trade is based 
on Leamer and Stern (1970). At the basis of the cms analysis is always the 
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assumption that a country’s share of exports in world imports should be 
constant. If the share in world imports changes, there is a difference between 
the constant market share norm and the actual export performance. The 
actual export performance could then be disentangled into four components: 
a market size effect, a commodity composition effect, a market distribution 
effect and a competitiveness effect. The analysis covers ten years. The first 
period covers 1992/1993 to 1997/1998, the second period covers 
1997/1998 to 2002/2003 and the final period covers 1992/1993 to 
2002/2003.  
The most striking result of the constant market share analysis is that all 
countries, for both types of commodities in all periods, perform poorly with 
respect to competitiveness. The competitiveness effect is always negative, 
but the variation between countries, time periods and commodities is 
substantial. Despite the negative competitiveness effect, most countries are 
doing well in the second period, increasing exports of vegetables much faster 
than the constant market share norm. The negative competitiveness effect is 
attributable to the market distribution effect: Although the countries grew 
faster than the world average, they should have increased exports even faster 
in order to keep up with the markets and commodities they were exporting. 
Contrasting to the initial period, the export improvement is obvious: in the 
first period, none of the countries grew faster than the world average. The 
recovery in the second period secures that three out of eight countries 
manage to grow faster than the world over the ten year period.  
The fruit sectors of the countries do not perform as well as the vegetable 
sectors. Furthermore, the fruit sectors generally do better in the first rather 
than the second period. In the second period only three of the countries 
display a positive growth in absolute terms. Those countries manage to grow 
much faster than the general world growth though. Despite that, the 
competitiveness effect is negative for the same reasons as it was for the 
vegetable sectors. They perform well but not as well as they should have, 
the market distribution effects outweigh the absolute increase in exports.  
The results of this study are somewhat surprising since at least some 
countries would have been expected to display a positive competitiveness. 
One reason relevant for the non-EU countries is the fact that the EU 
demands high sanitary standards on producers that wish to export to the 
union. This may be costly for exporters (Muaz, 2005) and could be one 
reason why the Mediterranean countries do not succeed as well in exporting 
as they should be expected to. In addition, Grethe et al. (2005) find the 
value of the preference margin for several Mediterranean countries’ exports 
to be substantial: the value of the preference margin amounts to a significant   31 
share of the agricultural exports value to the EU. This indicates that these 
countries, due to the preferential trade agreements with the EU, may 
succeed in their exports of fruit and vegetables despite not necessarily being 
competitive. The relatively poor competitiveness of the European Union 
member countries Spain and Greece could possibly be attributable to the 
very favorable treatment they have by being members of the EU. Given the 
very positive influence access to the EU is bound to have on the countries, 
beating the market size and market distribution effects may be difficult. 
Further studies are necessary though, to safely assess the basis of the low 
competitiveness factor. 
To conclude, it appears as if most of the Mediterranean countries 
perform less well than they should, given their potentials. Although quite 
some countries manage to increase their export shares in world imports, that 
is largely due to positive market distribution effects. Apparently, most of the 
countries depend on favorable historical export patterns for their successes in 
recent years. Without such an advantage, it is likely that the deterioration of 
the competitiveness would have led to less advantageous export changes. 
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4  Discussion 
This thesis includes four articles that all are related to supply of agricultural 
private or public goods. They do however cover different topics and utilize 
different methods and it is therefore not possible to draw any conclusions 
that are relevant for all articles. Article III has some relevance for the other 
articles though since it surveys the bordering literature. In a sense, it frames 
the other articles and facilitates interpretation.   
One important contribution of Article I is that it displays a novel 
approach to estimate the production costs of biological diversity on 
permanent grasslands. A caveat with the procedure followed in the article is 
that farmers currently do not receive payments that are strictly related to the 
level of biodiversity they produce. If a payment system was introduced that 
reimbursed farmers strictly for the biological diversity they produced, 
marginal lands would probably be used to a larger extent. Likewise, farmers 
would be more inclined to devote additional resources to pasture 
management for the purpose of increasing biodiversity. Both factors would 
change the shape of the supply function. A further implication is that costs 
are not static. In the long run, technological advances and improved 
knowledge of biological links are likely to decrease production costs. Thus, 
the cost functions estimated in Article I should be seen as short- and possibly 
medium-run cost functions. Given these aspects, an evident suggestion for 
further research would be to set up a test system where farmers that 
participate are paid according to the level of biodiversity they produce. The 
targets, linked to payment levels, could very well differ from the 
measurement used in this article, but it would be advisable to survey the 
participating pastures utilizing the same measurement as in this article. That 
should preferably be done both before and after the system is active, this in 
order to make comparison with the supply functions in this article possible.    34 
Article II investigates the transaction cost determinants of an agri-
environmental policy measure. The preliminary ordinary least squares 
regressions indicate that political factors have an impact on the level of 
transaction costs, but the extreme bounds analysis shows those results to be 
fragile. A given suggestion for further research would be to include the 
actual size of the pastures, rather than proxies, in the analysis. If data on area 
per maintenance plan were accessible it would be possible to give a better 
estimate on how transaction costs vary per managed hectare. Likewise, as 
mentioned in the article, the entire chain of transaction costs would 
preferably be included.  
The literature survey in Article III shows that although substantial work 
already has been performed for the development of efficient 
multifunctionality policy measures, additional research is necessary. One 
suggestion for future research is to focus on the impact that policies 
promoting landscape public goods might have on trade patterns. Although 
such policies could affect trade, little is known as to what extent that is the 
case in practice.  
The article that diverges the most from the others is Article IV. Utilizing 
the constant market share analysis and various trade pattern indicators, it 
shows that the investigated Mediterranean countries have performed poorly 
in fresh fruit and vegetable exports. Since these results are somewhat 
unexpected, future research could preferably focus on the underlying 
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